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WHO ARE YOU, INVESTOR: MR. SPOCK, CAPTAIN KIRK OR SOMEWHERE 
IN BETWEEN?
A Behavioural Finance exploration and suggestions for better informing investors 
about complex investment products through information disclosure
I. Introduction
Star Trek is a well-known science fi ction television show as well as a popular movie 
franchise. One consistent theme pervading Star Trek is embodied by two men, Mr. 
Spock and Captain Kirk. Both of these characters make important decisions about for 
instance the survival of the star ship Enterprise and its crew. In these situations, Mr. 
Spock is very rational and almost always emotionless, basing decisions on facts and 
probabilities. In contrast, Captain Kirk makes decisions based on his emotions and his 
‘gut feeling’.
In the fi nancial markets, investors have to make decisions on a daily basis as well. 
However, a recent study concluded that around 60% of sales in complex fi nancial 
products across the EU may be deemed unsuitable for consumers.1 Th e ‘Woekerpolis’ 
and ‘Eff ectenlease’ scandals in the Netherlands are just two of the many examples of the 
mis-selling of fi nancial products to consumers.2 In its eff orts to prevent these kinds of 
practices in the future and to restore trust in the fi nancial markets, the European Union 
heavily relies upon information disclosure by fi nancial institutions.3
* PhD researcher and Lecturer at the Department of Private Law and Notarial Law at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Groningen.
1 Commission Staff  Working Document ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key information documents for 
investment products’, SWD(2012) 187, p. 22; Synovate 2011.
2 Th ese products allowed retail investors to purchase securities with borrowed money (Eff ectenlease) and 
life insurances (Woekerpolis) with an investment element. Commissie Geschillen Aandelenlease 2004; 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten 2008. About the miss-selling of fi nancial products to consumers across 
the EU: Moloney 2012, p. 176; Ferran 2012, p. 249.
3 See about the underlying ideology of information disclosure Moloney 2010, p. 53 ff .
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Th e retail investment market is dominated by so-called ‘Packaged Retail Investment 
and Insurance Products’ (PRIIPS). A PRIIP could be described as:
“…a product where the amount payable to the investor is exposed to fl uctuations in the market 
value of assets or pay-outs from assets, through a combination or wrapping of those assets, or 
other mechanisms than a direct holding.”4
In April 2014, the European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on a 
mandatory Key Information Document (KID) for those kinds of investment products.5 
Recently, the Council of the European Union has adopted a Regulation regarding an 
information document designed specifi cally for non-professional investors (so-called 
retail investors).6 Th e two main objectives of this document are:7
1. Improving the comprehensibility of fi nancial products;
2. Improving the comparability of fi nancial products.
Th e focus on information disclosure through such a document as an instrument of retail 
investor protection suggests a belief that retail investors will make better choices if they 
are provided with information about fi nancial products. As the European Commission 
states, such documents serve as ‘the foundation’ for investment decisions by retail 
investors.8
Research in the fi eld of Behavioural Finance, a science that uses psychological and 
sociological concepts to describe and analyse both market ‘behaviour’ and behaviour of 
(fi nancial) market participants, suggests that the link between information disclosure 
and informed and optimal decision-making is not always clear.9 Suboptimal consumer 
decisions arise from a tendency in people to act irrationally. Th is irrational fi nancial 
4 Commission Staff  Working Document ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key information documents for 
investment products’, SWD(2012) 187, p. 32.
5 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key 
information documents for investment products, Strasbourg: 2  July 2012 (COM(2012) 352 fi nal) and 
European Parliament 2014.
 Th e introduction of an information document for consumers of investment products is not a new 
phenomenon. Examples of such information documents at a national level are the fi nancial information 
leafl et for complex fi nancial products (Financiële Bijsluiter) used in the Netherlands, a Key Features 
Document for ‘packaged products’ used in the United Kingdom and a Product Information Sheet 
(Produktinformationsblatt) in Germany.
6 Th e European Parliament and the Council, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs), 
Brussels: 24 October 2014. Th e articles and recitals referred to in the text are part of this Regulation.
7 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, recital 15,.
8 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key 
information documents for investment products, Strasbourg: 2 juli 2012 (COM(2012) 352 fi nal), p. 16. In 
other words on p. 15: “Retail investors should be provided with the information necessary for them to take 
an informed investment decision and compare diff erent investment products…”
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behaviour results from 1) personal factors, such as (the lack of) fi nancial knowledge and 
cognitive limitations, 2) social factors such as culture, the complexity of the fi nancial 
market and fi nancial products and 3) mental shortcuts such as biases and heuristics.10
Th is paper will focus on the mental shortcuts that may result in suboptimal fi nancial 
decisions. Insights from Behavioural Finance are especially valuable in this regard. Th ey 
allow for a greater predictability of suboptimal investors’ behaviour, since this behaviour 
is caused by certain heuristics (mental shortcuts) and biases (errors caused by these 
mental shortcuts). Despite individual diff erences, these heuristics and biases are common 
among all investors.
Th is paper, which is meant as a fi rst exploration of the subject, aims to examine 1) to 
what extent the proposed KID is likely to be eff ective in achieving its objectives, 2) 
whether it needs to be improved and 3) if so, in what way. First, the focus is on the 
proposal for a Key Information Document for PRIIPS (section 2). Section 3 examines the 
so-called ‘normative model’, which describes the mechanisms behind human rational 
behaviour. Section 4 will focus on the ‘positive model’, which describes how people 
actually behave.11 Finally, section 5 will explore ways in which the proposed information 
document could be adjusted in order to improve EU consumers’ investment decisions.
II. A new information document for retail investors: a brief overview
Investing in the fi nancial markets was once a privilege for the fortunate few. Now, it has 
become an essential part of EU citizens’ everyday life. Financial services, such as loans, 
mortgages, investments and insurance facilitate citizens’ full participation in the 
economy, enabling them to plan for the long term and protecting them from unforeseen 
changes in circumstances. A single retail market, which has been the overall EU objective 
in the last decade, is also of great signifi cance for the EU economy.12
Th e retail investment market is dominated by PRIIPs. Th ese products, taken together, 
make up 10 trillion Euros in the European fi nancial markets.13 PRIIPs have four 
characteristics. Th ey:14
– combine exposures to multiple underlying assets;
– are designed to deliver capital accumulation over a medium- to long-term investment 
period;
– entail a degree of investment risk;
– are usually marketed directly to retail investors.
10 Capuano  and Ramsay 2011, p. 77–167.
11 Given the size of this paper, only a selection of the existing heuristics and biases can be discussed. For 
more details, see section 4.
12 White Paper on Financial Services 2005–2010, COM (2005) 629; Green Paper on Retail Financial 
Services, COM (2007) 226; Initiatives in the Area of Retail Financial Services: Accompanying 
Document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM, 2007) 724 fi nal.
13 European Commission 2014, p. 1.
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Th ese complex fi nancial products can, broadly speaking, be categorized into four groups: 
investment funds, insurance-based investment products, retail structured securities and 
structured term deposits.15
Th e introduction of a KID aims to increase the comprehensibility and comparability 
of PRIIPs by the creation of a standardized and readily understandable document for 
retail investors containing information about the main features of an investment 
product, such as the costs and risks involved.16 Th e KID will answer a standard set of 
questions, such as: ‘What is this product?’, ‘What are the risks and what could I get in 
return?’, ‘What happens if [the name of the PRIIP manufacturer] is unable to pay out?, 
and ‘What are the costs’.17 Th e proposed information document is designed for the retail 
investor rather than the professional. It should help them make a more informed decision 
on whether a fi nancial product is suitable for them.
PRIIPs manufacturers should draw up the information document and publish it on 
their website before the product can be sold to retail investors.18 In addition, retail investors 
must receive the KID before a binding agreement is made.19 To promote comparability, 
every document will have the same structure and should be drawn up in a standardised 
format.20 It must be an accurate, fair, clear, and not-misleading document.21 Furthermore, 
the KID must be a short document with a maximum of three sides of A4-sized paper.22
Th e details of the information to be included in the KID and the presentation of this 
information will be further harmonised by means of so-called Level 2 instruments, 
which are delegated acts.23 Th ese instruments must:
“…take into account existing and ongoing research on consumer behaviour, including results 
from testing the eff ectiveness of diff erent ways of presenting information with consumers.”24
However, up until now, very little research has been conducted into the way in which the 
provision of information to investors by means of a short information document can be 
made eff ective. Existing research mostly concerns self-reporting with the investors’ 
perception of understanding a document as the prime consideration, instead of the 
question whether the information is actually understood.25 Besides, such research hardly 
15 European Commission 2014, p. 1.
16 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, recital 15.
17 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 8.
18 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 5 paragraph 1.
19 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 13 paragraph 1.
20 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, recital 17.
21 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 1.
22 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 4.
23 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 8 paragraph 5.
24 European Parliament  and the Council, recital 17. It is striking that article  8, paragraph 5 merely 
provides that ‘the capabilities of retail investors…’ need to be taken into account when developing draft  
regulatory technical standards. Th is formulation is less concrete.
25 See e.g. FSA 2003; IFF  andYouGov 2009  and Millward Brown / Centrum 2004. Th e most relevant 
research in this context was done by Chater. Huck  and Inderst 2010. However, this research has some 
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ever takes into account what is generally known about the ways in which investors read 
a text, understand it, and make decisions.26 It also remains to be seen to what extent the 
results of existing research apply to the KID. Among others the wide geographic reach of 
this document, the fact that many diff erent kinds of products are considered PRIIPs, and 
the complexity of these products could prevent this.
III. Th e Normative Model: Homo Economicus
According to Jeremy Bentham, a British philosopher, people seek the pursuit of pleasure 
and the avoidance of pain.27 Th is idea is, to some extent, related to the basic assumption 
of the proposed information document. As already described, this document is primarily 
based on the assumption that investors act rationally and will attempt to maximize their 
utility by choosing the fi nancial product with the highest monetary gains, just like Mr. 
Spock from Star Trek. In the ideal situation an investor takes into account all relevant 
information and in the end comes up with the best decision given the circumstances. In 
other words: such a rational investor is capable of making optimal investment decisions.
Th is idea is based on the normative model, which describes the assumed mechanisms 
behind human rational behaviour. Some characteristics of this normative model are:
a. Actively open-minded thinking: Openness to information that is not consistent with 
people’s opinions or beliefs.
b. Probability theory: Applying mathematical and statistical rules to determine the 
probability of events to occur.28
c. Logic: A decision should be based on valid reasoning.29
d. Expected utility theory: Based on this theory the optimum action on a problem 
which involves risk30 can be determined by calculating the utility of each possible 
outcome and multiply the outcomes by their probabilities.31 Based on the results, 
people should choose the option with the highest expected utility.
Th rough the years, researchers have found that people oft en do not behave in accordance 
with the normative model. For example, Kahneman and Tversky introduced an 
26 Chater, Huck  and Inderst 2010 does take this into account.
27 Bentham 1789/2000, p. 14.
28 Th e classical defi nition of probability is e.g. described by Ash (2008, p. 1) as follows: “…the probability 
of an event is the number of outcomes favourable to the event, divided by the total number of outcomes, 
where all outcomes are equally likely…”.
29 For example based on the Bayes’ theorem, however, in practice people are prone to ignore the base rate, 
which is called ‘base rate neglect’, see Kahneman  and Tversky 1973, p. 237–251.
30 In a risky situation, people know the possible outcomes and can assign a probability to each of these 
outcomes. In case of uncertainty, the possible outcomes are unknown or it is not possible to assign 
probabilities to known outcomes. Ackert  and Deaves 2010 p. 6 en 7; Knight 1921, p. 19–20;.
31 See Bernouilli 1954; Hardman 2009, p. 66. Th e modern utility theory is developed by Neumann and 
Morgenstern: Neumann  and Morgenstern 1944. Th e theory of expected value theory is closely 
connected to the expected utility theory. Th is theory says that a rational decision-maker should weigh 
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alternative to expected utility theory, the so-called prospect theory.32 Among others, 
according to prospect theory, people underweigh outcomes that are merely probable in 
comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty.33 Th ey also developed a 
modifi ed version of this theory to explain decision making when uncertainty is involved, 
the cumulative prospect theory.34 Furthermore, research shows that people use mental 
shortcuts which are not in line with the normative model. For example, the way in which 
information is framed infl uences how people make decisions. Th e next section focuses 
on these mental shortcuts.
IV. Th e Positive Model: Homo Sapiens
In 1974, Tversky and Kahneman gave a very detailed description of people’s decision-
making process in case of uncertainty:
“Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the 
outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. Th ese beliefs are 
usually expressed in statements such as “I think that…,” “chances are…,” “it is unlikely that…” 
and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form 
as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the 
probability of an uncertain event or the value of an uncertain quantity? (…) “…people rely on a 
limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgemental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite 
useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”35
As follows from this passage, people use mental processes to reduce cognitive eff ort, 
especially when faced with complex problems, just like Captain Kirk from Star Trek. An 
increase in the complexity of a decision will increase the use of mental shortcuts, such as 
heuristics. Th ese heuristics enable people to simplify matters and speed up the decision-
making process. As a drawback, these mental shortcuts sometimes cause errors: biases.
In this section, various heuristics and biases will be described, more specifi cally the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic, the recognition heuristic, the representativeness 
heuristic and the availability heuristic. Next, the following biases will be examined: 
32 Kahneman  and Tversky 1979; Tversky  and Kahneman 1992. However, prospect theory is not ‘the fi nal 
word’. Other alternatives to expected utility have been produced over the years. Amongst others, Allais 
rebutted one of the assumptions of expected utility theory, Savage’s sure-thing principle (Savage 1954) 
by the Allais paradox: a prospect choice problem which is fi rst proposed by Allais: Allais 1953a; Allais 
1953b. Furthermore, Bernouilli described a game, the so-called ‘St. Petersburg paradox’ which shows 
that the Expected Value Th eory must be wrong: Bernouilli 1954. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
prospect theory has been the prominent behavioural theory, there is also criticism, see amongst others 
Hogarth  and Reder 1986. Despite this criticism, most results of experiments are consistent with 
prospect theory.
33 Kahneman  and Tversky 1979, p. 263.
34 Kahneman  and Tversky 1992. Later, this theory was combined with support theory resulting in a two-
stage model: Tversky  and Koehler 1994; Fox  and Tversky 1998. See also Fox  and See 2003.
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choice and information overload, framing eff ect, overconfi dence bias, confi rmation bias, 
ambiguity aversion and the salience bias. Naturally, this is a selection of heuristics and 
biases. In making this selection, among others it was taken into account that the market 
for PRIIPs is very complex, that decision making involves uncertainty, and that most 
investors have little or no knowledge of and experience with fi nancial products.36
4.1. Heuristics
When people consider buying a product, for instance a fi nancial product, they do this 
with a comparison or estimate in mind. Th is comparison or estimate is the anchor. 
When receiving new information about the product, investors need to adjust their initial 
expectations. Th e anchor, however, will interfere with this adjustment. Due to this 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic, investors sometimes fail to get a proper understanding 
of a fi nancial product, since the anchor continuously infl uences their view of it.
Th e anchoring and adjustment heuristic can be illustrated by a more general example.37 
In an experiment, people were instructed to take a quick look at the following numbers:
1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8
Th en they were asked to estimate, without explicitly calculating, the fi nal answer of the 
product of these eight numbers. Most of the participants used the fi rst few numbers of the 
sequence as an anchor. Th erefore, they unconsciously multiplied the fi rst numbers in the 
sequence. Th e median answer was 512, whereas the true answer is 40.320. However, when 
the sequence was shown to them in the following way, the outcome was slightly better:
8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1
Since the fi rst numbers, and therefore the fi rst steps of multiplication, are higher in the 
fi rst sequence than in the second one, the former expression is judged larger than the 
latter. As a result, the median answer people gave in the descending case was higher as 
well, namely 2250. It appeared that using the product of the fi rst numbers as an anchor 
still led to insuffi  cient adjustment.
Th e recognition heuristic is the mechanism that leads people to prefer a familiar 
object over an unfamiliar one.38 As a result, investors may attach value to a fi nancial 
product based on recognition and familiarity, which could lead to a suboptimal 
investment decision. It could also have the eff ect of making an investment product of a 
familiar company seem less risky in comparison with an investment product of an 
unfamiliar company. Furthermore, the recognition heuristic could give rise to proximity 
bias, which is a fear of the unknown leading to proximity driven investments where 
investments one feels close to are preferred. Th is bias has various subforms such as home 
36 Nevertheless, other heuristics and biases can be relevant as well.
37 Tversky  and Kahneman 1974.
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bias, local bias, own-company bias and own-industry bias.39 Th ese biases cause investors 
to buy a fi nancial product from a local, regional or national business. Th erefore, greater 
gains from international diversifi cation are lost.40
In the precontractual phase, an investor tries to assess for example the returns of a 
fi nancial product. When judging probability, people are sometimes infl uenced by the 
representativeness heuristic:
“Representativeness is an assessment of the degree of correspondence between a sample and a 
population, an instance and a category, an act and an actor or, more generally, between an 
outcome and a model.”41
Th is heuristic could lead investors to assess the future performance of a fi nancial product 
on the basis of its past performance.
Furthermore, Tversky and Kahneman have shown that judgments of frequency 
sometimes form the basis for estimating probabilities, the so-called availability heuristic:
“A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or 
probability by the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind. To assess 
availability it is not necessary to perform the actual operations of retrieval or construction. It 
suffi  ces to assess the ease with which these operations could be performed, much as the diffi  culty 
of a puzzle or mathematical problem can be assessed without considering specifi c solutions.”42
One of the factors associated with this heuristic relevant to fi nance is imaginability, 
meaning that investors tend to perceive an investment as very risky when the risks 
involved are vividly presented.
4.2. Biases
In general, people prefer choice over no-choice, since keeping our options open could 
yield us with better outcomes. In this regard, the market for fi nancial products is 
wonderful: a great number of strongly diff ering products is off ered and this number and 
diversity keep increasing.43
39 French  and Poterba 1991 (home bias), Huberman 2001; Seasholes  and Zhu 2010 (local bias), Bernatzi 
et al. 2007 (own-company bias) and Døskeland  and Hvide, 2011 (own-industry bias).
40 Baker  and Nofsinger 2002, p. 101–102.
41 Tversky  and Kahneman 1983, p. 295. Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky wrote approximately a 
decade earlier: “A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an uncertain event, or a 
sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) 
refl ects the salient features of the process by which it is generated.” Kahneman  and Tversky 1972, p. 431.
42 Tversky and Kahneman 1973, p. 208. Criticism of the availability heuristic see e.g. Betsch  and Pohl 
2002.
43 E.g. Commission Staff  Working Document ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on key information documents for 
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However, research shows that more choice is not always better.44 More specifi cally, 
people can face diffi  culties when they need to process a large amount of information. 
Th is could lead to confusion and decision avoidance induced by profusion of information 
or choices that is diffi  cult to assimilate. Th is behaviour is known as information overload 
or choice overload.45
Th is bias is oft en studied with regard to ‘menu choices’. In one study, a tasting booth 
with jam was set up inside a grocery store.46 Two research assistants, dressed as store 
employees, invited passing customers to ‘come and try our Wilkin and Sons jams’. On 
the table were either 6 fl avours of jam (the limited-selection condition) or 24 diff erent 
jams (extensive-choice condition). Th e displays were rotated hourly. Th e study 
demonstrated that people liked the idea of ample choice, which was confi rmed by the fact 
that the table with 24 fl avours of jam attracted larger crowds. Surprisingly, the table with 
6 diff erent jams led to the most sales. Th e results prove that whereas the provision of a 
great many choices may seem highly appealing to consumers, it can reduce their 
motivation to actually make a choice.47
Figure 1. Müller-Lyer illusion
According to utility theory, only the outcomes and associated probabilities should 
determine which option is preferred by the decision maker. However, research shows that 
the way in which a question is asked to or a problem is mentally viewed by a decision maker 
has a strong impact on the answer given or the decision made (framing eff ect). Th e manner 
in which a decision scenario is described and presented is called framing. An analogy can 
be drawn between framing and visual perception, as shown by the Müller-Lyer illusion 
(fi gure 1).48 Infl uenced by the context of the inward or outward arrows, most of the people 
agree that line A looks longer than line B. However, in fact both lines are the same length.
44 Iyengar  and Lepper 2000, p. 995–1006.
45 Ackert  and Deaves, p. 86 en 362.
46 Iyengar  and Lepper 2000, p. 995–1006.
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Positive or negative framing of the same problem can have a substantial infl uence on 
people’s decision-making process. A classical example illustrating this is the Asian 
Disease scenario.49 In this study, people were asked to imagine that the U.S. was preparing 
for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which was expected to kill 600 people. Two 
alternative programs for combating the disease were proposed, namely a survival frame 
and a mortality frame:
Survival Frame (N= 152) Mortality Frame (N= 155)
– If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be 
saved. [72%]
– If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability 
that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. [28%]
– If Program A is adopted 400 people will die. 
[22%]
– If Program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability 
that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 
600 people will die. [78%]
Th e majority of the respondents reading the survival frame preferred option A, which 
could be characterized as the riskless option as it guarantees that 200 people will be 
saved compared to the possibility of loss for option B which makes gambling less 
attractive. Despite the fact that the options in the mortality frame are exactly the 
same, except that the outcomes are framed in terms of lives that might be lost, 
respondents reading the mortality frame preferred the risky option.50 Th is study 
illustrates that by changing the phrasing of information, people’s preference pattern is 
changed. When the options are framed in terms of gains, decision makers tend to be 
risk averse, that is, they wish to hold on to what they already have and refuse to gamble. 
In contrast, if the frame presents the choice in terms of losses, participants tend to be 
risk seeking.
Furthermore, many people are overconfi dent. Th e so-called overconfi dence bias 
takes account of this overconfi dence and addresses the tendency for people to 
overestimate their knowledge, skills, abilities and the accuracy of their information.51 
Resulting from this, investment decisions are oft en based on conjecture and not on 
fundamental value. Research suggests that overconfi dence in connection with 
personal-fi nance decision-making is widespread. For example, while 65% of the 
participants in a survey conducted in the United States thought they were very or 
49 Tversky  and Kahneman 1981. See also about choice in risky and riskless contexts: Kahneman  and 
Tversky 1984.
50 Remarkably, McNeil et al. showed that not just laypeople but also experts were susceptible to framing: 
McNeil, Pauker, Sox  and Tversky 1982. Furthermore, studies indicated that positive and negative 
framing is associated with diff erent levels of cognitive processing, see among others: Dunegan 1993; 
Gonzales, Dana, Koshino  and Just 2005; Payne, Bettman  and Johnson 1993. An fMRI study of framing 
suggest a role for aff ective infl uences: De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour  and Dolan 2006.
51 For instance, Alpert  and Raiff a 1982 and Block  and Harper 1991 about overconfi dence in connection 
with the accuracy of people’s estimations. However, some studies document ‘underconfi dence’ (or the 
‘below average eff ect’), especially in complex situations, e.g. Kruger 1999. Research suggest that men 
are much more optimistic than women when it comes to key economic and fi nancial performance 
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highly knowledgeable about their personal fi nance, it turned out that many fell short 
on objective questions’.52
According to psychological literature, two factors contribute to overconfi dence. First 
of all, the illusion of knowledge is related to the incorrect assumption that a large amount 
of information leads to a more informed decision, without taking account of the skills of 
the person interpreting the information.53 Second, illusion of control refers to people’s 
belief to have control over uncontrollable events. In other words, people underestimate 
the probability of unpleasant events. For instance, they oft en assume that a negative 
event, like losing a job, will not happen to them. Research shows that this illusion of 
control strengthens optimism.54
In addition, people have a tendency to search for information that confi rms their own 
opinions and do not search for or ignore evidence that contradicts these beliefs, a 
phenomenon known as confi rmation bias.55 For instance, this could cause people to 
decide to invest in a fi nancial product and ignore information that is not in favour of the 
investment.56 Another consequence could be that investors overlook the risks a fi nancial 
product entails. Furthermore, mental processing could alter key information in such a 
way that a specifi c investment decisions is favoured.
Furthermore, people tend to prefer risks that are known and predictable over 
unknown risks. Th is ambiguity aversion infl uences human behaviour in many ways.57 
Th is bias is demonstrated in the Ellsberg paradox.58 In this classic demonstration, 
subjects preferred to bet that a red (or black) ball could be drawn from an urn with 50 red 
balls and 50 black balls to one in which they were only informed that the urn contained 
100 balls but the number of black or red balls was unknown. Th is choice is driven by the 
fact that people prefer risk to uncertainty.
Finally, people’s attention is more easily drawn to conspicuous objects rather than 
ordinary objects. Th is propensity is known as the salience bias. It has important 
implications for the way people should be informed about fi nancial products. Aft er all, 
by ignoring less prominent information, investors could overlook important parts of an 
information document like the KID. Instead, they will focus on the information that 
looks important.
V. Th e eff ectiveness of the KID and suggestions for improvement
In this section, the described heuristics and biases will be used to assess the likely eff ectiveness 
of information provision by means of the KID when it comes to the two main objectives of 
52 Willis 2008, p.  235–236, in which he refers to a press release on MoneyWise’s website, National 
MoneyWi$e Survey Shows Americans Are Not Financially Fit, September 2005. Unfortunately, the 
report on which this press release is based, is not available on this website.
53 E.g. Willis 2008, p. 235.
54 Capuano  and Ramsay 2011, p. 133.
55 Th is confi rmation bias is one of the drivers of overconfi dence.
56 Pompian 2006, p. 187–190.
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this information document: improving the comprehensibility and comparability of fi nancial 
products. In addition, various recommendations for promoting this eff ectiveness are 
formulated. For the sake of clarity, the analysis of the eff ectiveness of the KID and the 
various recommendations will be described below on the basis of the two purposes of the 
KID. In this regard, it should be noted that, naturally, there will some overlap.
5.1. Comprehension of complex fi nancial products
Various heuristics and biases appear to prevent investors from making better investment 
decisions through the KID. First, the fact that investors prefer products off ered by a 
known or geographically close provider (recognition heuristic) raises the question 
whether the KID will actually be able to reduce this tendency and adequately inform 
investors. Conceivably, certain preferences of investors are hard to change by means of 
such a short information document.
Second, considering the representativeness heuristic, there is a risk that investors 
make the mistake of considering past performance of a fi nancial product to be a good 
indicator for its future performance. However, this performance naturally depends on, 
among others, the development of the underlying assets of the fi nancial product. It is 
therefore important to make clear to investors that the information in the KID is only 
helpful to a certain extent when it comes to predicting future returns. In this regard, it 
could be helpful for the Level 2 instruments to provide that the KID state that past 
performance off ers no guarantees for future results.59
Furthermore, in the fi nancial markets, investors are commonly fl ooded with 
information.60 In combination with the large number of fi nancial products this could lead 
to choice and information overload. Consequently, investors will tend to follow their gut 
feeling when purchasing a fi nancial product, hardly make any use of fi nancial knowledge 
and ignore information documents such as the KID. In addition, the KID will initially 
appear to investors to be yet another information document, and may therefore lead to a 
greater information overload. It is therefore important for the KID to actually contribute 
to a greater clarity regarding the fi nancial product. If the KID outlines the most important 
information about a fi nancial product in an intelligible way and in practice functions as 
an easy-to-read summary, it might reduce information overload. On the other hand, this 
could cause investors to perceive the fi nancial product as easy to understand, which, 
among others, may have the eff ect of them not analysing the product suffi  ciently.
However, examination of existing short information documents shows that these oft en 
contain complicated language, which could lead consumers to having little incentive to 
actually make the eff ort to try to understand the document. Considering the complexity 
and large number of PRIIPs available this will likely to be a more prominent problem. It is 
therefore to be welcomed that the KID must be written in a concise manner on a maximum 
of three sides of A4-sized paper and composed in a language that is clear, succinct and 
59 Th is is not required as yet. Such a statement is required for the Key Investor Information Document for 
UCITS: art. 15 paragraph 5, sub a Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010.
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comprehensible.61 In this context, however, it should be noted that a similar rule also applies 
to various existing information documents.62 Examination of these particular documents, 
however, shows that they also oft en contain complicated language and jargon. Th erefore, 
this point also requires attention when it comes to the new information document.
Th e requirement that an explanatory statement emphasizing this purpose be placed 
underneath the title is therefore to be welcomed.63 However, research suggest that text 
above the title oft en goes unnoticed by investors, something which may be true for 
statements underneath the title as well.64 Th erefore, the practical usefulness of such a 
statement is questionable. Besides, before they come across this explanatory statement, 
investors already need to have taken the step to read the KID. Perhaps herein lies an 
important role for fi nancial advisors.
However, despite the regulations and recommendations described above, the question 
remains whether the new information document will suffi  ciently motivate investors to 
try to really understand fi nancial products and compare them. Especially, as already 
noted, since there is such a large number of fi nancial products available. In the literature, 
Willis also argues that the availability of an overwhelming number of fi nancial products 
contributes to people frequently not applying a rational decision-making strategy or 
fi nancial knowledge.65 Th e introduction of the KID will not cause a decrease in the 
number of these fi nancial products, nor diminish their complexity. Instead, this 
complexity should be reduced by means of an information document. Not least in view 
of the information overload and choice overload it remains to be seen whether the KID 
will be eff ective in informing investors about fi nancial products.
Fourth, the eff ectiveness of the KID when it comes to informing investors appears to 
be very much dependent on the ways in which the information is presented and phrased. 
Th is seems especially to be of importance considering the availability heuristic, framing 
eff ect and the ambiguity aversion bias. When, for instance, risks are presented vividly, 
investors oft en consider the risks to be higher than when this is not the case (availability 
heuristic). It is therefore important for those risks to be described in a similar manner in 
the various KIDs. Aft er all, if one document describes the risks of a certain fi nancial 
product much more realistically than another, this could lead to an incorrect assessment, 
i.e. an overestimation or underestimation of the risk. Standardization of the ways in 
which for instance the risks and costs of a fi nancial product are presented is therefore a 
good thing.66 Th is also applies to the technical standards that will be developed regarding, 
among others, the methodology for the presentation of the risks and costs in the KID.67 
Standardization could perhaps be promoted in practice by the provision of a KID 
61 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 4.
62 E.g. art. 78 paragraph 5 Directive 2009/65/EU.
63 Th is statement reads as follows: “Th is document provides you with key information about this investment 
product. It is not marketing material. Th e information is required by law to help you understand the 
nature, risks, costs, potential gains and losses of this product and to help you compare it with other 
products.” (European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 8 paragraph 2).
64 Financial Services Authority 2003, p. 26.
65 Willis 2008, p. 228–229.
66 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 8.
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generator. In the Netherlands, composers of a Financial Leafl et can use such a computer 
program for the creation of this document.
Besides, the framing eff ect also illustrates that positive or negative framing of 
information can have a substantial infl uence on people’s decision making process. If, for 
instance, information is framed negatively, an investor will be more inclined to take 
risks. It is therefore vital for the information in the KID to be balanced, since, for instance 
an overemphasis on costs and losses can serve as a warning, but can also induce high-
risk behaviour in investors. When used in practice, it will become clear if the information 
in the KID is balanced enough. In addition, considering the framing eff ect, merely 
prescribing which information needs to be included in the document and how the 
document needs to be designed will most likely not suffi  ce. Diff erences in phrasing 
among various documents could lead to suboptimal decisions, and therefore defeat the 
purpose of the KID.68 A certain standardization of the phrasing of information is 
therefore recommended. Th e KID generator proposed above could probably also promote 
uniform phrasing the largest extent possible.
In addition, people tend to be ambiguity averse and choose risks they know over risks 
they do not know. Th is ambiguity aversion infl uences also the way in which investors 
take decisions. Considering this bias, it is also important for the description of risks in 
the various KIDs to take place in a similar manner and that the clarity level concerning 
risks is the same to the maximum extent possible. Aft er all, if this is not the case, this can 
for instance lead to investors choosing a predictable greater risk over an unknown, but 
lower risk. At present, however, it is still unclear how this will be further harmonized 
through Level 2 instruments.
Th e KID is not expected to prevent investors from overestimating their own 
knowledge and being too optimistic about the future (overconfi dence bias). Research 
demonstrates that overconfi dence bias can be reduced by the provision of detailed 
information regarding the actual risks and consequences a certain decision entails.69 It 
seems therefore desirable for the information in the KID to be suffi  ciently specifi c. Th is, 
however, is not likely to be achieved by means of the KID, since it is but a short document.70 
Findings of the examination of existing short information documents are consistent 
with this observation. Oft en, the information in these documents is very general with 
investors being referred to an advisor or other documents for further information. In the 
KID, it will be allowed to refer to other, more detailed documents, such as the Prospectus.71 
However, this means that consumers actually need to take the step to consult these other 
documents. Since many consumers overestimate their own fi nancial knowledge as a 
result of overconfi dence bias, it remains to be seen whether they are actually going to do 
this. Also relevant in this context is the fact that, when presented with choice, people 
tend to choose the option that needs little or no work.72
68 Whether such a case constitutes a misleading document in the sense of art. 6 European Parliament  and 
Council 2014, is unknown.
69 Capuano  and Ramsay 2011, p. 132–133.
70 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 4.
71 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 2.
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Furthermore, the confi rmation bias is expected to have an eff ect on the way investors 
perceive information provided by a short information document, as the KID. With 
regard to this bias, investors tend to select information which is consistent with their 
own wants, and ignore other information. In addition, mental processing could alter key 
information in such a way that a specifi c investment decision is favoured. Combined 
with the fact that this bias could also lead investors to overlook certain risks involved in 
a highly wanted fi nancial product it is doubtful whether the KID will give investors a 
greater insight into a particular fi nancial product. With regard to this bias as well, it 
seems to be desirable to promote the comparing of fi nancial products by investors and to 
provide information which is suffi  ciently concrete in this regard. However, the latter will 
not expected to be possible, considering that the limited size of the KID leaves much 
room for interpretation on the side of the investor. As a consequence, the information 
could be interpreted in such a way, that it appears to be consistent with the investors’ 
personal preferences and views, whereas this might not be the case objectively.
Considering the salience bias, important for the KID to be eff ective, is that it needs to 
look like an important document. In this regard, the document should be carefully 
designed and the content needs to be easy to understand. Among other things, this fi ts 
the requirements that the information in the KID must be accurate and clear.73 Th e 
requirement that the KID be clearly distinguishable from marketing materials in this 
context is also important, as is the requirement that the KID state that it is, in fact, a 
legally required document.74However, regarding the latter requirement, it needs to be 
noted that, in order to notice this statement, consumers already need to have taken the 
step to read the KID. Th erefore, it remains to be seen whether such a statement makes 
this document look suffi  ciently clear compared to other documents.75 Furthermore, the 
requirement that the KID be clearly distinguishable from marketing material alone, does 
not suffi  ce, since the KID also needs to look more important than promotional materials. 
Th is could perhaps be achieved by placing the logo of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority on it. Further research will have to show whether this will actually 
lead consumers to regard this document as important.76
Finally, considering the salience bias, the most important parts of the KID need to look 
the most important. In fact, if one part stands out more than others, such as for instance an 
infographic, chances are that another part is overlooked. Knowledge of this bias therefore 
also off ers the opportunity to emphasize the most important information in the KID.
5.2. Comparing complex fi nancial products
First, examination of the heuristics and biases demonstrates that it appears to be a good 
thing that the purpose of the KID is to enable investors to compare fi nancial products. 
73 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 1.
74 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 2 and art. 8 paragraph 2 respectively.
75 See footnote 64.
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Research shows that increased eff ort and motivation to compare fi nancial products can 
reduce the infl uence of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic:
“…adjustment is eff ortful, and so anything that increases a person’s willingness or ability to seek 
more accurate estimates tends to reduce the magnitude of adjustment-based anchoring biases.”77
Th e fact that the KID endeavours to make it easier for investors to compare fi nancial 
products is, considering this heuristic, desirable. Th is increased comparability reduces 
for instance the infl uence of the anchor thus expectedly limiting the role of the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic.
However, given the recognition heuristic, it remains to be seen to which extent the 
KID will actually lead consumers to actually consider foreign products and providers 
when comparing fi nancial products. Aft er all, fi nancial products from a familiar or 
geographically close provider are by defi nition deemed better. It appears unlikely for the 
KID to change this.
In any event, it is important for consumers to experience as few barriers as possible 
when it comes to the comparison of fi nancial products. Aft er all, if the comparison of 
products requires a lot of eff ort and motivation, investors will be more inclined to use 
mental shortcuts, such as the described heuristics. In this context, the fact that the 
content and design of the KID must be standardized seem to be a step in the right 
direction.78 In addition, the requirement that the document must be short, concise, and 
easy to understand, will likely lead to it requiring less eff ort and motivation of consumers 
when it comes to comparing fi nancial products.79 Besides, it is therefore only to be 
welcomed that the Regulation off er room for the development of calculation tools, 
allowing investors to easily calculate costs of various products.80
Th e comparability of documents is likely to increase if they can be accessed on a 
central website.81 In addition, consideration could be given to the introduction of a 
product comparison website for complex fi nancial products. At present, comparison 
websites already exist for many diff erent kinds of products such as car insurance and 
electronics, and are being visited by many people.82 Such a website may be helpful to 
investors as well.
It is furthermore vital for investors themselves to be aware of the importance of 
comparing fi nancial products. By means of Level 2 instruments could perhaps be 
stipulated that the document needs to explicitly state that it is of great importance to 
compare various products in order to be able to gain insight into the risks and possibilities 
they entail. Additionally, fi nancial advisors could make investors aware of this.
77 Epley  and Gilovich 2006, p. 316.
78 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, recital 17.
79 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, art. 6 paragraph 4.
80 European Parliament  and the Council 2014, recital 36.
81 And thus not only on the website of the PRIIPs manufacturer, European Parliament  and the Council 
2014, art. 5 paragraph 1.
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VI. Final Remarks
Finally, research suggest, that the described heuristics and biases cannot be prevented by 
informing investors about them, and that these errors are also likely to occur when 
people are trying their best to be careful.83 An important cause of this appears to be the 
fact that they are unconscious cognitive processes that are hard to infl uence. In addition, 
increasing fi nancial knowledge is not expected to prevent the errors described, since 
even experts make these errors.84 It is therefore extra important for policymakers to take 
these heuristics and biases into account when draft ing regulations such as for instance 
the new information document.
Considering the described heuristics and biases, it seems doubtful whether the new 
information document will be eff ective when it comes to informing investors and 
stimulating them to compare fi nancial products. However, the analysis of the likely 
eff ectiveness of the KID and the formulated recommendations are not meant as a fi nal 
step, but rather as a fi rst exploration of the subject. Aft er all, experimental research off ers 
ways to study more concretely whether, and if so how, the content and design of the KID 
can actually contribute to consumers being adequately informed and able to compare 
fi nancial products. Insights from Behavioural Finance, a selection of which were 
discussed in this paper, allow for a greater predictability of investors’ behaviour and 
therefore hopefully constitute an initial step into the right direction.
It must be noted that this paper does not elaborate on the question to which extent an 
information document for complex fi nancial products is desirable, since the European 
legislature has already made the decision to introduce such a document.85 However, it is 
questionable whether the recommendations formulated in this paper will actually lead 
consumers to better understand fi nancial products and compare them with each other. 
First, these recommendations and the goals of the KID may clash. For example, the 
documents being short could help improve the comparability of information documents, 
while, on the other hand, more information could possibly enhance their comprehensibility. 
Second, a part of the research described is based on laboratory studies and does therefore 
not necessarily apply to information provision by means of a short information document 
like the KID. Besides, it should be noted that many heuristics and biases could prevent a 
proper provision of information through an information document.86 Only a small 
number of heuristics and biases were described in this paper. Partly in view of the 
aforementioned, experimental research could be helpful in exploring whether an 
83 Daniel Kahneman, Nobel laureate, admits in his book (Kahneman 2011, p.  417): “…my intuitive 
thinking is just as prone to overconfi dence, extreme predictions, and the planning fallacy as it was before 
I made a study of these issues.” See also Arkes 1991; Financial Services Authority 2008, p. 54; Hertwig 
and Ortmann 2003.
84 See amongst others Hilton 2003; Kahneman 2013.
85 About the eff ectiveness of mandated disclosure e.g. Ben-Shahar  and Schneider 2014.
86 For example, Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2014, p. 115: “In short, since biases and heuristics are so many 
and since people respond so variously, nobody could write mandates that can account for that chaos of 
thought and passion, all confused”. See also Van Boom, Giesen  and Verheij 2013, p. 1179–1189 which 
clearly shows that empirical research and the ensuing results are not always directly applicable when it 
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information document could actually lead to consumers being adequately informed about 
a fi nancial product and stimulate them to compare fi nancial products with each other. 
Probably other alternatives, such as choice architecture, will be more helpful to consumers.87
Now, back to the question posed in the title of this paper: ‘Who are you, investor: Mr. 
Spock, Captain Kirk, or somewhere in between?’ As it turns out, investors are not as 
rational as Mr. Spock, but have more in common with Captain Kirk. However, when 
thinking about an answer to this question, the decisions made by Mr. Spock and Captain 
Kirk do not really matter that much. Aft er all, even though Captain Kirk and Mr. Spock 
have been known to make many important decisions, they did so within the realm of 
science fi ction. Th e consequences of purchasing an unsuitable fi nancial product are real 
and include for instance becoming homeless or spending one’s old age worrying about 
money and suff ering the ensuing emotional and social consequences. As was established 
earlier in this paper, insights from Behavioural Finance can help discover who these 
investors are and how they make decisions. Th erefore, despite the apparently dubious 
link between information disclosure and investor decision making, fi ne-tuning of the 
proposed regulation regarding a Key Information Document based on these insights 
seems at least helpful when it comes to achieving its two main objectives: improving the 
comprehensibility and comparability of fi nancial products. Th is can only be achieved by 
taking into account how investors actually understand and compare fi nancial products.
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